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I. INTRODUCTION
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1. See generally ARTHUR CECIL PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE ( Palgrave Macmillan,
2013).
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The aim of this article is to analyze the extent to which the causation requirement is consistent with the provision of efficient incentives to potential tortfeasors. Specifically, this article focuses on the
role of the well-known “but for” or “sine qua non” test. According to
the “but for” test, an action is a “sine qua non” condition of an accident if, given the circumstances, the accident would not have occurred had another action been taken. Thus, the “but for” test seems to
isolate something we care a lot about in explaining events and in assessing responsibility: the idea that the defendant’s act makes a difference. Reaching beyond the sole “metaphysical” interest of this
causation concept, the theoretical analysis developed in this article
investigates to what extent the “but for” causation requirement has a
deterrent effect on the behavior of potential tortfeasors, particularly
in situations where the tort system may provide suboptimal incentives. Arthur Cecil Pigou already emphasized that if the purpose of
tort law is to force the economic agents to pay the true costs of their
activities, including damages incurred by others, a robust use of the
concept of causation is needed. 1 Accordingly, we show to what extent
the “but for” test is useful for making the potential tortfeasors internalize the social costs of their activities.
This study falls into the framework of Law and Economics
(hereinafter “L&E”). Remarkably, L&E provides a unified framework, using tools from decision theory and statistics to expound the
definitional issues of causation and its potential consequences on
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2. See Omri Ben-Shahar, Causation and Foreseeability, in 1 E N C Y C L O P E D I A OF LAW
E C O N O M I C S 83–108 (2d ed. 2009) (providing a survey of L&E contributions to the study of
causation).
3. Id.
4. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Causation in Tort Law: An Economic Approach, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 109, 134 (1983).
5. Id. at 111.
6. Guido Calabresi, Concerning Cause and the Law of Torts: An Essay for Harry Kalven,
Jr., 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 69, 84 (1975).
7. See generally Henry W. Edgerton, Legal Cause, 72 U. P A . L. R E V . 343 (1924); Leon
Green, Duties, Risks, Causation Doctrines, 4 1 TEX. L. REV. 42 (1962); Wex S. Malone, Ruminations
on Cause-In-Fact, 9 STAN. L. REV. 60 (1956).
8. See Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1, 2 (1960).
AND
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human behavior. 2 Nevertheless, it is not commonplace in L&E to
claim that the causation requirement may have incentive effects. Indeed, L&E is primarily interested in how the law and institutions
provide or should provide incentives for efficient behavior. As underlined by Omri Ben-Shahar, part of the L & E literature has disregarded the possibility of a distinct role of causation in shaping
incentives for potential tortfeasors. 3 For example, William Landes and
Richard Posner indicate that the discussion on causation is fruitless,
because “the key factors in the economic analysis are not cause but the
probability of accident and the costs of legal administration.” 4 Consequently, causation could be disregarded as an unimportant question in
L&E. Accordingly, Landes and Posner assert that the Judge Hand formula is sufficient, and that a legal concept of causation is not necessary.
Indeed, following Landes and Posner, the Judge Hand formula could be
viewed “as an algorithm for deciding tort questions generally – not just
issues of negligence.” 5 Similarly, according to Guido Calabresi, liability
should be assigned to the injurer if she is the lowest-cost avoider in
order to ensure efficiency of preventive measures. 6 Thus, information
on causation seems to not affect the result of this cost-benefit analysis,
and the assignment of legal cause can be reduced to a normative
evaluation of the economic efficiency of the preventive measures undertaken by the involved parties. This skepticism in L&E regarding
causation also arises from the question of the implementation of legal
causation, while other sources of criticism include the American Legal
realists, such as Henry Edgerton, Wex Malone, and Leon Green. 7 Accordingly, it seems difficult to assign liability on the basis of causation, because both an injurer and a victim are necessary for any harm
to occur. 8 Hence, if efficiency is the goal to be attained, causation
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9. Calabresi, supra note 6, at 84.
10. See generally Richard A. Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151 (1973);
Ben-Shahar, supra note 2.
11. Calabresi, supra note 6, at 73.
12. Id. at 71 (“[T]here is a causal link between an act and an injury if the recurrence of that act or
activity will increase the chances that the injury will also occur. Whereas with the proximate cause, one
must remember, in the chain of events that could have caused the damage, the one that is closest to its
realization.”).
13. Id. at 107.
14. Edgerton, supra note 7, at 211.
15. Steven Shavell, An Analysis of Causation and the Scope of Liability in the Law of Torts, 9 J.
LEGAL STUD. 463, 464 (1980).
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should be assigned to the cheapest cost avoider following Calabresi’s
approach. 9
Another part of the L&E literature acknowledges that causation
can have effects on human behavior, but casts into doubt the role that
a causation requirement could play regarding the efficiency objective. Rather, it seems that the doctrinal requirement of causation
serves goals other than efficiency. 10 For instance, Calabresi suggests
that causation is a functional concept in the sense that different notions of causation may further different human goals, including deterrence, spreading and distribution. 11 To demonstrate this
proposition, Calabresi differentiates between three distinct notions of
causation: ( 1 ) ”but for” causation (formerly called “cause in fact”); (2)
“proximate cause”; and (3) the “causal link.” 12 Calabresi concludes his
study by showing that in law “but for” causation, like proximate cause,
is a functional concept designed to achieve human goals in the end. In
other words, the use of specific notions of causation is tailored to
meet specific objectives. 13 Therefore, one cannot choose a definitive
notion of causation to be uniformly applied to all tort cases.
Earlier, Henry Edgerton offered a similar perspective, indicating that
“the solution of cases depends upon a balancing of considerations which tend
to show that it is, or is not, reasonable or just to treat the act as the cause
of the harm—that is, upon a balancing of conflicting interests, individual
and social[.]” 14 In other words, the choice of a particular causation
notion seems to be less a matter of efficiency than a matter of justice,
and the decision to choose a particular notion of causation is likely
to be context-dependent. Like Calabresi and Edgerton, Steven
Shavell also adopts an instrumental approach to causation, analyzing
this area of law with the aim to understand “how the law functions to
promote postulated social goals, given assumptions about the behavior of
individual parties.” 15 Therefore, he compares the incentives provided
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16. Id. (Probability cause is closely related to the German school theory of “adequate
cause”. An act is considered to be a probabilistic cause of an injury relative to another act if the
probability of occurrence of this injury would have been lower had the other act been taken).
17. Id. at 502.
18. Edgerton, supra note 7, at 347.
19. STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 106 (2009).
20. Id.
21. Shavell, supra note 15, at 463.
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by two different causation notions: “but for” causation and the “probability cause.” 16 However, Shavell acknowledges that such an instrumentalist approach can face one major criticism: “Questions about
causation are to an important extent resolved by resort to intuitions about
the justness of applying a rule of liability. In practice . . . it is not asked
how liability would affect incentives or otherwise influence the attainment
of certain basic social goals.” 17 Hence, there is a gap between the L&E
debate on the efficiency of causation and the legal practice, which
may disregard efficiency when evaluating the cause requirement.
Indeed, the cause requirement could be simply considered as a matter
of justice, and as Edgerton suggests, it may depend on “our free and
independent sense of justice and—perhaps—the interest of society.” 18
Notwithstanding these different approaches to causation, a third
path in the L&E literature considers that the understanding of causation is determinant to set the socially optimal level of care or activity
of the potential tortfeasor. Our paper is in line with this sub-part of
the literature. In this line of argument, Shavell defines an action, such
as the level of care or activity to be “the necessary cause of a consequence
relative to another action if, given the state of the world, the consequence
would have been different had the second action been taken.” 19 Building
on this notion of “necessary cause,” Shavell shows that the socially
optimal level of care or activity is determined only by the states of the
world in which the injurer’s action would be the necessary cause of
harm. 20 It follows directly that the “scope of liability” can be more or
less restricted to these “necessary causes.” The “scope of liability,”
presented by Shavell, can be understood as the circumstances under
which the tortfeasor is held liable. 21 This scope of liability can be restricted to necessary causes, or can be unrestricted, in which case the
injurer is held liable even in the event that the harm would have occurred in the absence of the injurer’s activity. It can also be overly restricted, which leaves outside the scope of liability some cases of
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22. Id. at 464; see also SHAVELL, supra note 19, at 465; WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A.
POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 11 (1987).
23. Mark F. Grady, Untaken Precautions, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 139, 140 (1989); Mark F.
Grady, A New Positive Economic Theory of Negligence, 9 2 YALE L. J. 799, 799–801 (1983);
Mark F. Grady, Proximate Cause and the Law of Negligence, 69 IOWA L. REV. 363, 363–64
(1983); Keith N. Hylton & Haizhen Lin, Negligence, Causation, and Incentives for Care, 35
INT’L R EV . L. & E CON . 80, 80–82 (2013); Marcel Kahan, Causation and Incentives to Take Care
Under the Negligence Rule, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 427, 427–29 (1989); Stephen Marks, Discontinuities,
Causation, and Grady’s Uncertainty Theorem, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 287 (1994).
24. Hylton & Lin, supra note 23, at 80
25. Id. at 80–81.
26. HERBERT LIONEL ADOLPHUS HART & TONY HONORÉ, CAUSATION IN THE LAW (Oxford
Univ. Press, 1985) (1959).
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necessary causes. Hence, a well- defined scope of liability may be determinant to achieve the socially optimal level of care or activity. 22
Moreover, in this strand of the literature, the effect of the causation requirement in negligence-based liability regimes is the object
of an in-depth analysis by M a r k Grady, Marcel Kahan, Stephen
Marks, Keith Hylton, and Haizhen Lin. 23 Specifically, these authors
show that the causation test removes the discontinuity in the incentives to provide care. Indeed, as highlighted by Hylton and Lin, “in a
negligence regime that does not incorporate the factual causation inquiry,
there would be a discontinuous jump in liability once a potential injurer
adopts a precaution level slightly below the reasonable care level. When the
factual causation test is incorporated, there is no longer such a discontinuous jump.” 24 Furthermore, this strand of the literature has focused on
the role of causation requirement in both strict liability and negligence-based liability regimes, in situations where causation is ambiguous. 25 Our paper departs from this approach by investigating the
role of causation in situations in which causation is unambiguous.
We focus on situations where the tort system may provide suboptimal incentives because of: (1) limited liability problems, or; (2)
other sources of uncertainty, in particular the uncertainty about the
injurer’s actual level of care. We ask whether information about causation then plays a useful role in achieving efficiency. Understanding the
potential effects of the “but for” test in these settings is particularly
important, given that the “but for” test is a widespread causation test
in both civil law and common law countries on the one hand, and
given the relative frequency of limited liability and informational issues
in tort cases on the other hand. 26 The remainder of this article includes
the following sections: Section II introduces the hypothesis and the
notations of the model; Section III presents the results of our theoretical analysis under the assumptions of the standard model, as well
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as the results for the special cases of limited liability and imperfect
observability of care; and Section IV concludes this article.
II. THE MODEL
This theoretical analysis relies on a standard model of unilateral
accident. In this setting, an agent—the potential injurer—can engage
in a risk- generating activity ( that is, in some circumstances, likely to
generate a harm of amount L to some third party). Nevertheless, when
he engages in the activity, the agent can invest in preventive measures
that may have an effect on whether the harm occurs or not. We define
below circumstances under which the decision to engage in the activity
and the level of care are necessary causes of the harm under the “but
for” notion of causation.
A. Level of Care as a Necessary Cause of Harm

ͳ
߮ሺ݁ǡ ݏሻ ൌ ሼ
Ͳ

if  ݏ ݁
if  ݏ ݁

Thus, the probability of accident is ሺ݁ሻ ൌ ͳ െ ܨሺ݁ሻ for ݁ א
ሼ݁ ǡ ݁ ሽ.

05/10/2016 13:13:34

Consequently, in the event that  ݏ  ݁ , a low level of care ݁ is
sufficient to avoid the occurrence of harm. Moreover, no harm occurs
whether el or eh is chosen by the agent. Similarly, if the agent engages
in the activity and is such that Ͳ ൏ ݁ ൏  ݏ ݁ , then a low level of care
is the necessary cause of the occurrence of the harm.

37837-ckt_91-2 Sheet No. 52 Side B

Suppose a continuum of possible states of the world  ܵ א ݏൌ
ሾͲǡͳሿ with a cumulative distribution function F(s). The occurrence of
the harm depends on both the values of s and the level of care provided by the agent, denoted e. Let ߮ሺ݁ǡ ݏሻ   אሼͲǡͳሽ denote respectively
the non-occurrence and the occurrence of the harm L when the agent
has engaged in the risk generating activity. A given level of effort ݁
produces different effects in terms of occurrence of harm, given the
state of the world. There are two possible care levels, which are ݁ and
݁ , with Ͳ ൏ ݁ ൏ ݁ ൏ ͳ. The level of care is chosen by the agent before the realization of the state of the world. After realization of the
state of the world, the outcome is:
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B. Activity as a Necessary Cause of Harm
There are cases where a harm can occur without the activity or
without the level of care of the agent being its necessary cause. Let
݇  ܵ אൌ ሾͲǡͳሿ be a threshold defining when the activity is a sine qua
non condition of the occurrence of the harm. If  ݏ ݇, the harm occurs
even if the agent does not engage in the activity. Consequently, if  ݇,
the activity is not considered to be the cause of the harm. Conversely,
according to the “but for” notion of causation, the activity is the cause
of harm when  ݇. Hence, if the scope of liability is restricted to instances of necessary causes, the agent may be held liable for harm only
if  ݏ ݇. Note that for ݇ ൌ ͳ, the activity is always a necessary cause
of the occurrence of the damage, as the “but for” condition  ݏ ݇ is
fulfilled for all  ݏin ܵ ൌ ሾͲǡͳሿ. Observe also that for ݇ ൌ ͳ, the model
corresponds to the famous example of the cricket game and fence
developed by Marcel Kahan in 1989. In this example, the level of care
e would represent the height of a fence surrounding a stadium in
which a cricket game takes place. The state of the world  ݏrepresents
the height at which a ball flies.
Figure 1: Occurrence of harm depending on the state of
nature and the level of care.

37837-ckt_91-2 Sheet No. 53 Side A
05/10/2016 13:13:34

In this example, no accident occurs if no cricket game takes
place—which corresponds to the hypothesis of the activity as a necessary cause of harm. If the ball flies higher than the fence and harms
someone, that is if  ݏ ݁, the level of care is a necessary cause of
harm.
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C. Occurrence of Harm
To summarize, the timing of the game is as follows: At the first
stage, the agent chooses whether or not to engage in the activity. If she
enters the activity, she chooses her level of care ݁   אሼ݁ ǡ ݁ ሽ. At the
second stage, “Nature” chooses the state  ݏin [0, 1]. Hence, four different situations can be observed: (a)  ݏ ݇: harm occurs even in the
absence of activity. The activity and the level of care of the agent are
not causes of harm. Conversely, if  ݏ൏ ݇, harm occurs only in the presence of the activity. The activity is the cause of the harm. Under this
latter condition, we have the three following remaining cases: (b)  ݏ൏
݁ and  ݏ൏ ݇: for any level of care exercised by the agent, no harm
occurs; (c) ݁ ൏  ݏ ݁ and  ݏ൏ ݇: harm occurs if and only if the agent
engages in the activity with a low level of care ݁ ; (d) ݁ ൏  ݏand  ݏ൏
݇: for any level of care exercised by the agent, harm occurs. The activity is then the cause of harm, but not the level of care exercised by the
agent. Figure 1 summarizes the combined role of the engagement in
the activity, the level of care and the state of the world in the occurrence of the harm. It shows a situation where Ͳ ൏ ݁ ൏ ݁ ൏ ݇ ൏ ͳ.
Depending on the location of  ݏon the graph, the activity and the
level of care may or may not be the cause of the harm.
At the third stage of the game, if harm has occurred, the case is
examined by the court and liability is assigned.

D. Social Optimum
37837-ckt_91-2 Sheet No. 53 Side B

For simplicity, we assume in the following computations that
the situation described in figure 1 holds; i.e. we have Ͳ ൏ ݁ ൏ ݁ ൏
݇ ൏ ͳ. Let c denote the cost of high care. The cost of low care is normalized to zero. Let b denote the benefit from engaging in the activity. Suppose also that c differs between potential injurers. Let c be
distributed according to the cdf H(c) with support ሾͲǡ ܿതሿ.
We know that high care is socially efficient when א ܿ
ሾͲǡ ܿത ሿǡ ܮሺ݁ ሻ  ܮሺ݁ ሻ  ܿ, equivalently when,
ܮሾܨሺ݁ ሻ െ ܨሺ݁ ሻሿ  ܿ, (1)
and engaging in the activity is socially efficient if:
ܾ  ܮሾܨሺ݇ሻ െ ܨሺ݁ ሻሿ  ܿ. (2).

05/10/2016 13:13:34
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E. Liability Regimes
Three different liability regimes are considered: the strict liability
regime, the negligence rule with a causation requirement and the negligence rule without a causation requirement. Under the strict liability
regime, the liability is assigned in all cases where the activity is the
cause of the harm, i.e. if  ݏ൏ ݇—which includes situations (b), (c) and
(d) previously described. Under the negligence rule with causation
requirement (NC), liability is assigned to the tortfeasor only if the
harm would not have occurred but for inappropriate care. Therefore,
under (NC), liability is assigned only if the case (c) is met (݁ ൏  ݏ
݁ and  ݏ൏ ݇) and the agent has chosen ݁ . By contrast, under the negligence rule without causation requirement (NN), liability is assigned
if the activity caused the harm and low care was exerted. In other
words, liability is assigned whenever the level of care is ݁ and  ݏ൏ ݇
(cases (b), (c) and (d)).

III. RESULTS
A. Standard Model

1. Strict Liability

05/10/2016 13:13:34

Let ܥ denote the injurer’s expected cost if he exerts low care and
ܥ his expected cost if he exerts high care. We have ܥ ൌ ܮሾܨሺ݇ሻ െ
ܨሺ݁ ሻሿ, indeed liability is assigned only for s < k, and ܥ ൌ
ܮሾܨሺ݇ሻ െ ܨሺ݁ ሻሿ  ܿ. Given the benefits b, the incentives provided by
a liability regime are given by the difference in the expected costs of
care. The agent is induced to choose eh if Ch í Cl < 0. Under strict
liability, we have:

37837-ckt_91-2 Sheet No. 54 Side A

Suppose that (1) holds for all possible cost levels among the
population of potential injurers, meaning that high care is always
socially warranted when one has engaged in the activity. Suppose
further that the benefits from the activity are “large,” in the sense that
they always satisfy (2). The issue is then simply to induce high rather
than low care from those who engage in the activity (rather than to
regulate entry in the activity).
We now compare the different liability rules; assuming that an
injurer can be found liable only if the harm was caused by the activity.
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ܥ െ ܥ ൌ ܿ  ܮሾܨሺ݁ ሻ െ ܨሺ݁ ሻሿ  ൏ Ͳ
This expression is indeed negative if equation 1 holds.
2.

Negligence Rule with Causation Requirement

Similarly, if the (NC) regime is implemented, the difference in the
expected costs of care is:
ܥ െ ܥ ൌ ܿ  ܮሾܨሺ݁ ሻ െ ܨሺ݁ ሻሿ  ൏ Ͳ
Indeed, we have:
ܥ ൌ ܮሾܨሺ݁ ሻ െ ܨሺ݁ ሻሿ andܥ ൌ ܿ.
3.

Negligence Rule Without Causation Requirement

Conversely, under the (NN) regime, we have:
ܥ െ ܥ ൌ ܿ  ܮሾܨሺ݇ሻ െ ܨሺ݁ ሻሿ  ൏ Ͳ. This is explained by the cost
structure under (NN), which is ܥ ൌ ܮሾܨሺ݇ሻ െ ܨሺ݁ ሻሿ and ܥ ൌ ܿ.
4.

Choice of a Liability Regime

B. Limited Liability

05/10/2016 13:13:34

The above results presumed that injurers pay fully for the harm
caused when they are held liable. Suppose now that, due to limited

37837-ckt_91-2 Sheet No. 54 Side B

Given equations 1 and 2 are met, ensuring that engaging in the
activity and choosing a high level of care is optimal, the achievement
of the social optimum can be done equally well with strict liability or
with a negligence rule setting due care at eh and assigning liability only
when inadequate care is the cause of harm. Indeed, the strict liability
and the (NC) regime both lead to incentives corresponding to equation 1.
Now that we have presented the effects of the causation requirement in the standard model of civil liability, we investigate the
efficiency incentives provided by the “but for” test in situations that
usually provide sub-optimal incentives: the presence of limited liability on the one hand, and imperfect information about care on the other hand.
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liability (or because legal damages are capped), the damages actually
paid are in fact D < L. Let us assume:
ܦሾܨሺ݁ ሻ െ ܨሺ݁ ሻሿ ൏  ܿҧ. (3)
Combining (1) and (3) yields:
 ܦ൏ ிሺ

ҧ

 ሻିிሺ ሻ

൏ ( ܮ4)

Consequently, some injurers, those with larger costs, will not exert
efficient care and this will be true either under strict liability or under
the negligence rule.
Moreover, to abstract from inefficient incentives to engage in the
activity, let us also assume that:
ܾ  ܮሾܨሺ݇ሻ െ ܨሺ݁ ሻሿ. (5)
Thus, engaging in the activity is socially warranted even when
low care is exerted.
We now compare the three different liability rules under analysis. Given the cap on damages, the incentives provided by a liability
regime are given by the difference in the probability of being found
liable when one exerts low rather than high care. Denote this difference by ¨, which we will refer to as deterrence. Note that in the present context, the best regime is the one that maximizes deterrence.
Specifically, an injurer exerts adequate care if c  D¨. The proportion
of injurers exerting adequate care is therefore H(D¨).
1. Strict Liability

2. Negligence with Causation Requirement (NC)
Under the (NC) regime, we have ܥ ൌ ܦሾܨሺ݁ ሻ െ ܨሺ݁ ሻሿ, ܥ ൌ ܿ.
The incentives satisfy:
οே ൌ ܨሺ݁ ሻ െ ܨሺ݁ ሻ, and are the same as under strict liability.
3. Negligence Without Causation Requirement (NN)
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We have ܥ ൌ ܦሾܨሺ݇ሻ െ ܨሺ݁ ሻሿ, ܥ ൌ ܦሾܨሺ݇ሻ െ ܨሺ݁ ሻሿ  ܿ. Under strict liability, we have:
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Under the (NN) regime, we have ܥ ൌ ܦሾܨሺ݇ሻ െ ܨሺ݁ ሻሿ, ܥ ൌ ܿ.
Incentives are now:
οேே ൌ ܨሺ݇ሻ െ ܨሺ݁ ሻ
The rule maximizing deterrence is the negligence rule (NN),
implying that one should disregard whether inadequate care was the
cause of harm. The reason is straightforward: from the point of view of
incentives, a negligence rule amounts to a monitoring system with
stochastic audit. An agent’s behavior is audited following the occurrence of harm. If the agent is then found to have complied with due
care, he is not sanctioned. If the agent is found not to have complied, he should then be sanctioned if the objective is to maximize
deterrence. The probability of sanctioning “deviant” behavior (conditional on being audited) is larger under the negligence rule NN than
under the rule NC, hence incentives are greater under NN.
If D is sufficiently large, even though (4) holds, a switch to the
negligence rule NN may yield first-best incentives. Indeed, we could
have ܿ  ܦοேே and equation (4) simultaneously fulfilled. Otherwise,
one could go a step further.
4. No Causation Requirement Regarding the Activity

C. Imperfect Information About Care

05/10/2016 13:13:34

Now suppose that care is unobservable. Under this assumption,
the strict liability regime remains feasible as does the negligence rule
(NC). Indeed, after the realization of the state of the world, s and k
remain perfectly observable, moreover the possible values of care el
and eh are also public information. Hence, even if the level of care
actually implemented is unobservable, it is possible to implement the
“but for” test to the injurer’s choice to engage in the activity, by com-
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Suppose one drops the requirement that the activity be the cause
of harm. Under strict liability we would then have ܥ ൌ ܦሾͳ െ ܨሺ݁ ሻሿ,
ܥ ൌ ܦሾͳ െ ܨሺ݁ ሻሿ  ܿ and deterrence would remain the same. Under the rule NC, nothing would change either. However, under the
NN we now have ܥ ൌ ܦሾͳ െ ܨሺ݁ ሻሿ, ܥ ൌ ܿ and incentives are
ο̈ ேே ൌ ͳ െ ܨሺ݁ ሻ.
Thus disregarding all causation issues increases deterrence further still. When he is “audited,” a non-complying injurer is then always sanctioned.
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paring s and k. Moreover, inadequate care can be inferred from the
occurrence of harm and the comparison of  ݏwith ݁ and ݁ . However,
the negligence rule (NN) is not implementable. For instance, if we
have ݁ ൏ ݁ ൏  ݏ൏ ݇, harm occurs, but it is impossible to infer if eh or
el has been chosen by the agent.
Suppose next that care is imperfectly observable. One observes a signal x with the conditional densities ݃ሺݔȁ݁ ሻ and ݃ሺݔȁ݁ ሻ
and common support [x, ݔҧ ]. Without loss of generality, suppose the
ሺ௫ȁ ሻ
signal satisfies MLRP with the likelihood ratio
strictly deሺ௫ȁ ሻ
creasing in x. The available evidence is then the occurrence of harm
and the observation of s and x. Let ȥ(s, x) 䌜 [0, 1] denote the court’s
decision, defined as the probability of holding the injurer liable given
the available evidence.
The injurer’s expected cost given his level of care is then:

Figure 2: Assignment of liability when care is imperfectly
observable
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Therefore, choosing ȥ(s, x) to maximize deterrence yields ȥ(s, x) = 1
when s < eh , for all x; and conversely:
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Deterrence can be written:

37837-ckt_91-2 Sheet No. 56 Side B

05/10/2016 13:13:34

05 DEFFAINS FLUET ROPAUL FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

540

4/15/2016 8:38 PM

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol 91:2

In other words, when ൏ ݁ , the mere occurrence of harm allows to
infer that ݁ has been chosen by the agent. Thus, negligence is inferred
from the occurrence of harm, and the injurer is found liable, under the
above decision rule. Nevertheless, when s [ אeh , k), the occurrence of
harm, once again, provides no information by itself. Under the above
decision rule, the injurer is then found negligent if, on the basis of the
imperfect evidence x, low care is “more likely” than due care. Given our
ሺ௫ȁ ሻ
convention that the likelihood ratio
is decreasing in x, negliሺ௫ȁ ሻ
gence is therefore found for some threshold x. Our findings are
summarized in figure 2. Figure 2 shows that the liability rule b
amounts to the negligence rule (NC) with the “preponderance of evidence” standard for a finding of negligence. According to this standard, the injurer is held liable if negligence is more likely than not on
the basis of the evidence, which consists here of both s and x.
1. No Causation Requirement Regarding the Activity
As in the previous section, and for the same reason, deterrence
can be increased further by dropping the requirement that the activity cause the harm. The injurer would then be found liable when s <
eh or when s  eh and x < b.
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In the legal tradition, the notion of cause is necessary to make
the link between a harmful event and damage. Indeed, the causation
requirement illustrates the simple, yet highly justice-oriented idea that
“one who has caused harm must compensate for the harm caused.”
Pragmatically, economists view the tort system as a victim- triggered
ex post incentive mechanism (i.e. post-accident) providing ex ante
incentives to prevent harm. In this spirit, L&E investigates whether
the traditional legal notion of causation yields efficient incentives. As
this article demonstrates, the answer to this question is nuanced. In
simple situations, such as those described in the standard model, it
seems that the causation requirement, operationalized with the “but
for” test, leads to efficient incentives. Indeed, our theoretical analysis
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shows that both the strict liability and the negligence rule with causation requirement (NC) induce the agent to adopt the socially optimal
level of activity and care, if liability is restricted to the cases where the
activity is a necessary cause of harm. In situations where there are
traditionally sub-optimal incentives, the answer is more complex.
First, in the event of limited liability, disregarding all causation issues— concerning the care level or the activity—induces greater incentives to provide care. Thus, under the assumption of limited
liability, the implementation of a negligence rule without a causation
requirement (NN) is preferred. In our framework, under limited liability, the tort rule (NN) ensures a higher probability of sanctioning
negligent behavior.
Moreover, when care is imperfectly observable, dropping the
causation requirement may increase the deterrence effect of the liability regime. When the “but for” test is still applied concerning the role
of the activity in the occurrence of the harm, the model shows that the
optimal liability rule amounts to a negligence rule with a causation
requirement regarding the level of care (NC), together with the preponderance of the evidence standard. Hence, when care is imperfectly
observable, the causation requirement would have two aspects: a sine
qua non condition is applied to the level of activity, while the level of
care is evaluated with a probabilistic notion of causation. The model
also shows that dropping the causation requirement on the activity
level induces higher incentive for preventive measures. Hence, while
in the literature the discrepancy between liability regimes is often
ascribed to uncertainty over causation, this article exemplifies that it
may also arise without uncertainty over causation.
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